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COYLE v. COMMONWEALTH.
"would be a family scandal," clearly
threatening injury to her good name,
accompanied by general abusive treat-
ment, were held to be duress so as to
avoid a deed executed by her under a
rcasonable apprehension that they would
be carried into effect.
The case of Tapley v. Tapley, above
cited, and the principal case are themost
satisfactory cases upon the subject under
consideration that have so far come to
oar notice, and the principal case is
especially valuable in that it meets the
question fairly and squarely and states
the principle that ought to govern such
cases in a clear and forcible manner. 'We
prophesy that it will become a leading
case in this branch of the law.
As to the threat that influenced the
action in question having been directed
against the defendant's son instead of her
personally, see Barris v. Carmody, 20
Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 663, and note.
M. D. EwELL.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
COYLE v. THE COMMONWEALTH.
Homicidal mania must be proved, not assumed, nor confounded with reckless
frenzy; To instruct, however, that it must be proved by " clearly preponderating
evidence" is -error. All the authorities require is that the evidence proving it
should "fairly" preponderate.
An attempt at suicide is not of itself evidence of insanity, and raises no legal
presumption thereof.
ERRoR to the court of Oyer and Terminer of York county.
M nEnci], J., delivered the opinion of the court.
It was clearly proved that Coyle killed Emily Myers. That
fact is admitted. The only defence set up is that he was insane at
the time.
The first specification assigned for error is that in referring to
homicidal insanity the court cited approvingly a portion of the
language of Mr. Chief Justice GIBSoN, in Commonwealth v. Mioser,
4 Barr 264, in which it is said "there may be an unseen ligament
pressing on the mind, drawing it to consequences which it sees but
cannot avoid, and placing it under a coercion, which, while its
results are clearly perceived, is incapable of resistance. The
doctrine which acknowledges this mania is dangerous in its rela-
tions, and can be recognised only in the clearest cases. It ought
to be shown to have been habitual or at least so have evinced
itself in more than a single instance."
The able argument of counsel has failed to convince us that this
was not a correct declaration of the law, or that it has since been
ruled otherwise by this court.
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I The validity of such a defence is. admitted, but the existence of
such a form of mania must not be assumed without satisfactory
proof. Care must be taken not to confound it with acts of reckless
frenzy. When interposed as a defence to the commission of high
crime, its existence should be clearly manifest' Such defence is
based on an unsound state or condition of the mind proved by acts
and declarations of violence. It certainly is not requiring too
much to hold that it shall be shown in more than a single instance.
We know no later case in this state where the precise question has
been ruled otherwise.
The second specification relates to the effect which shall be given
to the attempt of the prisoner to take his own life. This attempt
was made immediately after he had fired the shots which caused the
death of his victim. The language objected to was not in answer
to any point submitted, but appears in the general charge. The
court said, "it appears proper to say to you, as a matter of law,
that even if you believe the prisoner really intended to take his
own life, this would not be of itself evidence of insanity. It would
only be a circumstance in the case to be considered by you in con-
nection with other facts and circumstances, f6r the purpose of
enabling you to determine the mental condition of the prisoner.
The fact of the attempted suicide raises no presumption of
insanity."
The court was dealing with the question of attempted suicide
only, and whether that alone was exidence of insanity. It adopted
the very language used by the court below in American Life Ins.
Co. v. Assetts, and affirmea by this court in 24 P. F. Smith 176.
In Laros v. Commonwealth, 3 Norris 200, the defence was insanity.
It was objected that the court below said to the jury, "you can not,
however, infer insanity from the heinous, atrocious character of
the crime, or to constitute it as an element in the proof of actual
insanity." The answer here was, "the court did not mean to
say that where proof of insanity is given, the horrid and unnatural
character of the crime will lend no weight to the proof; but
meant only that the terrible nature of the crime will not stand
as the proof itself, or an element in the proof of the fact of
insanity. There is a manifest difference between that which
is actual evidence of a fact, and which merely lends weight to
the evidence which constitutes the proof. This is all the court
meant."
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So we understand the language used in the present case to mean
that the attempt to commit suicide, of itself, is not evidence of the
fact of the insanity of the prisoner, and it raises no legal presump-
tion thereof, but it may be considered by the jury with all the
other facts and circumstances bearing on the question of insanity.
Sometimes it may be evidence of a wicked and depraved heart,
familiar with crime. At others, of despondency and discourage-
ment; but perhaps more frequently of cowardice, of a lack of
courage to face ignominy and public disgrace, or to submit to the
punishment likely to be imposed on him.
The third specification presents more difficulty. In answer to a
point submitted, the court charged, "the law of the state is that
when the killing is admitted, and insanity or want of legal responsi-
bility is alleged as an excuse, it is the duty of the defendant to
satisfy the jury that insanity actually existed at the time of the
act, and a d6ubt as to such insanity will not justify the jury in
acquitting on that ground. The law presumes sanity when an act
is done, and that presumption can only be overthrown by clearly
preponderating evidence." Excluding the last sentence, this
answer contains a clear and correct statement of the law. It is
not sufficient cause for an acquittal of one charged with crime, and
defending under the plea of insanity, that a doubt is raised as to
its existence. As sanity is presumed, when the fact of insanity is
alleged, it must be satisfactorily proved. Ortwein v. Commonwealth,
26 P. F. Smith 414; Lyjnch v. Same, 27 Id. 205. The question
remains, what degree of proof is necessary to overthrow the pre-
sumption of sanity ? The court said it can be "only by clearly
preponderating evidence." The court also (misled it is said by the
language in the brief furnished it) cited the case of Brown v. Com-
monwealth, 28 P. F. Smith 122, as declaring " to establish this
defence (viz., insanity) it must be clearly proved by satisfactory
and clearly preponderating evidence."
This is not the language of that case. It is demanding a higher
degree of proof than the authorities require. It may be satisfac-
torily proved by evidence which fairly preponderates. To require
it to "clearly preponderate" is practically saying it must be proved
beyond all doubt or uncertainty. Nothing less than this will make
it clear to the jury, and make them conclusively convinced. This is
not required to satisfy the jury: Heister v. Laird, 1 W. & S. 215.
It is not necessary that the evidence be so conclusive as to remove
VOL. XXX".-25
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all doubt: Ortwein v. Commonwealth, supra; Brown v. Same,
supra; Myers v. Same, 2 Norris 131; Parnell v. Same, 5 Id.
260. When one is on trial for his life care must be taken that he
receives fiom the court that due protection which the law has wisely
thrown around him. Evidence fairly preponderating is sufficient.
We discover no error in the fourth specification.
Judgment reversed and venire facias de novo awarded.
The question whether the burden of
proof rests on the Commonwealth in
criminal cases, where the defence of
insanity is interposed, has attracted con-
siderable attention within the last few
years. The defence interposed in the
trial of Guiteau called public attention
to the subject, but it only served to bring
more prominently to the public notice
that which before had been a matter of
deep concern both to bench and bar.
Within the last year or two there have
been a number of decisions on this in-
portant subject rendered by the courts
of last resort, and the question involved is
of such a nature that it may be worth
while to ascertain the exact status of the
matter at the present time.
Three different theories have beit
maintained in relation to this subject.
First, it has been held that inasmuch as
every man is presumed to be sane, the
burden of proof will rest on the defend-
ant to overcome the presumption by a
clear preponderance of the evidence.
In other words he must establish his
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
This theory, whatever may have been
thought of it at one time, is now regarded
almost universally as entirely unjustifi-
able, inhuman, and absurd. At one
time it was supported by the courts of
Alabama, Delaware, Missouri and New
Jersey: Brinyea v. State, 5 Ala. 241 ;
State v. Danby, 1 Houston Cr. Cas.
(Del.) 175 ; State v. Pratt, Id. 269 ;
State v. Boice, Id. 355 ; State v. Draper,
Id. 531; State v. T"omas, Id: 511 ;
State v. Huting, 21 Mo. 464; State v.
Spencer, I Zabriskie (N. J.) 201. But
this doctrine has been overruled in
Alabama and Missouri, as we shall here-
after see. In Delaware the doctrine does
not appear to have been abandoned.
The case in New Jersey, although it has
found its way into the regular reports,
is not a decision of the court of last
resort, but a mere charge to the jury
given by Chief Justice HoRInDLwOn
in the Hudson County Oyer and Ter-
miner, in 1846. The question has never
been decided by either the Supreme Court
or the Court of Appeals.
The second theory, and the one most
generally adhered to, is that announced
in the principal case. That inasmuch as
every man is presumed to be sane, the
presumption of sanity prevails necessarily
until it is shown to be false by a prepon-
,derance of evidence. That the burden
of proof rests on the prisoner to show
his insanity to the satisfaction of the
jury by a preponderance of the evidence.
This theory is maintained in Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas
and Virginia-thirteen States.
Alabama: This theory was adopted in
this state in a very elaborate opinion,
ii 1879, in Boswell v. State. 63 Ala.
307. "1 Isanity is a defence which must
be proven to the satisfaction of the jury,
by that measure of proof which is re-
quired in civil causes ; and a reasonable
doubt of sanity, raised by all the evi-
dence, does not authorize an acquittal."
See McAllister v. State, 17 Ala. 434;
Brinyea v. State, 5 Id. 241 ; State v.
Marer, 2 Id. 43.
Arkansas: The question as to the
burden of proof in such cases was briefly
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alluded to, in 1870, in McKenzie v.
State, 26 Ark. 334, 341. It was said
that the prisoner must produce evidence
sufficient to change the presumption raised
against him by the proof of the killing.
California: In People v. Wreden, 12
Rep. 682 (1881), the Supreme Court
again announced its adhesion to the
theory we are considering, having pre-
viously adopted it in cases cited below.
In that case, as in the particular case,
the court considered the effect of an
instruction that the prisoner must prove
his insanity by a clear preponderance
of the evidence. It said: "Is not the
expression I clearly established by satis-
factory proof,' the full equivalent of
'established by satisfactory proof beyond
a reasonable doubt?' How can a fact
be said to be clearly established so long
as there is a reasonable doubt whether it
has been established at all ? There can
be no reasonable doubt of a fact after it
has been clearly established by satisfac-
tory proof." And see People v. Coff-
man, 24 Cal. 233; People v. McDonnell,
47 Id. 134; People v. Wilson, 49 Id.
14; People v. Messersnzith, 57 Id. 575.
Iowa: The court holds that the pre-
sumption of sanity cannot be avoided
except by a preponderance of proof, the
defence of insanity being an affirmative
defence. But it need not be made out
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the pre-
ponderance of the evidence shows the
insanity of the defendant, it raises a
reasonable doubt of his guilt; State v.
Pelter, 32 Iowa 49 (1871). This theory,
said the court, is in accord with the
weight of authority, and has the support
of reason, humanity and public policy.
Kentucky : This too is the rule adopted
in Kentucky. A mere doubt of sanity
is insufficient to rebut the 'presumption
of sanity. That presumption must be
rebutted by a preponderance of evidence,
but if the evidence preponderates,.the
jury are not to convict "merely because
they might entertain a rational doubt"
as to his insanity: Kriel v. Common-
wealth, 5 Bush 362 (1869) ; Graham v.
Commonwealth, 16 B. Mon. 587; Smith
v. Commonwealth, 1 Duval 224.
Maine: In State v. Lawrence, 57 Me.
574 (1870), is to be found an able pre-
sentation of the theory that the burden
rests with the prisoner to establish his
insanity by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. " Sanity is assumed and treated
as an essential attribute of humanity.
The indictment follows the statute, set-
ting out all the acts deemed essential to
the crime, but omitting all reference
to the capacity of the accused. Of all
that is set out in the indictment he is
presumed innocent, and that must be
proved and nothing else. When that is
proved he is convicted, unless he inter-
poses some defence other than a sane
denial of the allegations against him.
A simple plea of not guilty, puts in issue
the allegations, and only the allegations
in the indictment, and as to them the
prosecution has the affirmative. * * *
The plea of insanity is, and of necessity
must be, a plea of confession and avoid-
ance. * * * It does not meet any ques-
tion propounded by the indictment, but
raises one outside of it. It is not a mere
denial, but a positive allegation."
Massachusetts: "The presumption
must be rebutted by proof of the con-
trary, satisfactory to the jury." Such
proof may come from the testimony of
the state, or from testimony presented by
the defence: Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7
Met. 500 ; Commonwealthv. Eddy, 7 Gray
583; Commonwealthv. Heath, 11 Id. 303.
Missouri : Such is now the law in this
state: State v. Klinger, 43 Mo. 127 ;
State v. Smith, 53 Id. 267 ; State v.
.Redemefer, 71 Id. 173; State v. Erb, 74
Id. 199.
North Carolina: The jury is to be
"satisfied" of the prisoner's insanity:
State v. Payne, 86 N. C. 609 (1882) ;
Morehead v. Brown, 6 Jones (Law) 366.
Ohio : Such is the law of this state as
determined in 1857, and since adhered
to : Loefner v. State, 10 Ohio St. 598;
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Bond v. State, 23 Id. 349; Bergin v.
State, 31 Id, 115.
Pennsylvania: The doctrine in the
particular case as to the burden of proof
is clearly established by a series of cases :
Ortwein v. Commonwealth, 76 Penn. St.
423 (1874) ; Lynch v. Commonwealth, 77
Id. 205 (1874); Meyers v. Common-
wealth, 83 Id. 141 (1876) ; Pannell v.
Commonwealth, 86 Id. 268 (1878);
Sayres v. Commonwealth, 88 Id. 301
(1879).
Texas : The Court of Appeals declines
to say upon whom the burden of proof
lies when the defence of insanity is in-
terposed. "We do not deem it necessary
or incumbent upon us to unravel or
attempt to answer the misty mazes and the
metaphysical disquisitions indulged by
the opposing theorists about sanity being
essential to criminal intent, and criminal
intent being essential to punishable crime,
nor their equally abstruse and obscure
views as to which side has the burden
of proof when the sanity of the defend-
ant, from whatever cause, acquires a
status in the case." The court holds
that "the evidence of insanity, to war-
rant an acquittal, should be sufficiently
clear to convince the minds and con-
sciences of the jury :" Webb v. State, 9
Tax. Ct. of App. 490 (1880); King v.
State, Id. 553 ; Johnson v. State, 10 Id.
577 (1881) ; Clar v. State, 8 Id. 350
(1880) ; Carter v. State, 12 Texas 500
(1854). But in a case just decided in
the Court of Appeals it is laid down that
the burden is on the prisoner in such
cases to establish his insanity by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence: Jones v.
State, 15 Reporter 27, 28 (January 3d
1883).
Virginia: The prisoner must prove
his insanity to the satisfaction of the
jury: Boswell's Case, 20 Gratt. 860;
Baccigalupo's Case, 33 Id. 807. But he
need not prove it beyond reasonable
doubt: Dfarnette v. Commonwealth, 75
Va. 867.
The third and last theory is that the
burden of proof rests on the State to
prove the sanity of the prisoner. The
presumption of sanity will be indulged
in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary. if the defendant introduces no
evidence which tends to prove insanity,
the presumption stands. But if he gives
evidence tending to overthrow the pre-
sumption of his sanity, casting doubt and
uncertainty upon it, it is the duty of the
state by affirmative evidence to prove
his sanity beyond a doubt. This theory
is maintained by courts of the very
highest standing, and has received the
emphatic approval of some of our ablest
and most enlightened judges. The
reasoning of the opinions in which this
conclusion has been reached seems to the
writer to be entirely logical, and in
harmony with that humane and wise
requirement of the law that every man
shall be presumed innocent until his guilt
has been shown beyond a reasonable
doubt. The question may well beasked,
"1 How can a jury say, ' We have no
doubt of the guilt of the prisoner, but
we do doubt whether he was sane ?' "
This theory is maintained in Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi,
N ebraska, New Hampshire and New
York and Tennessee-nine States.
Illinois: In a case decided in 1859 it
was held that the burden of provinginsan-
ity rested on the prisoner : Fisher's Case,
23 Ill. 293. But in 1863. that case was
overruled, and was declared to have been
decided under peculiar circumstances not
admitting of much deliberation. The
presumption of innocence was declared
to be as strong as the presumption of
sanity: Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 385.
Sanity is as essential an ingredient of
crime as the overt act. If the evidence
raises a doutt of the prisoner's sanity
the burden is on the prosecution to remove
that doubt: Chase v. People, 40 Ill.
352.
Indiana: If the prisoner raises a
reasonable doubt as to his sanity, it is
necessary for the state to prove mental
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soundness beyond a reasonable doubt.
This theory was adopted and has been
adhered to since 1862: Polk v. State,
19 Ind. 170; Stevens v. People, 31 Id.
485 ; Gueting v. State, 66 Id. 94.
Kansas : The same theory was adopted
in 1873 by the able court of this state
in a well reasoned opinion. The sanity
of the prisoner "ought to be made out"
said the court, "in the same way, by
the same party, and by evidence of the
same kind and degree, and as conclusive
in its character, as is required in making
oat any other essential fact, ingredient,
or element of murder." State v. Craw-
ford, 11 Kaus. 32.
Michigan : One of the most satisfac-
tory opinions maintaining this theory is
that pronounced by the Supreme Court
of this state in the case of the People v.
Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9. The opinion was
by Chief Justice CooLEr,. After show-
ing that the crime of murder is only
committed when a person of sound mind
and discretion unlawfully kills another
with malice, express or implied, the court
declares that the prosecution takes upon
itself he burden of establishing not only
the killing, but the malicious intent.
"There is no such thing in law as a
separation of the ingredients of the
offence so as to leave a part to be estab-
lished by the prosecution, while as to the
rest the defendant takes upon himself
the burden of proving a negative. The
idea that the burden of proof shifts in
these cases is unphilosopbical, and at war
with fundamental principles of criminal
law. The presumption of innocence is
a shield to the defendant throughout the
proceedings, until the verdict of the jury
establishes the fact that beyond a reason-
able doubt lie not only committed the
act, but that lie did so with malicious
intent." The same doctrine was affirmed
in People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482.
Mississippi : The subject was carefully
considered in this state in 1879, in Cun-
ningham v. State, 56 Miss. 272. The
opinion delivered is an able presentation
of the theory we are considering. After
stating that there can be no crime with-
out mental accountability, the court
declares, that it fails to see any con-
sistency or logic in holding that the state
must establish all the elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, with
the exception of the prisoner's sanity,
" But it is said that the law presumes
sanity. So the law presumes malice
from the fact of killing; but if anything
in the testimony, either of the state or
of the defendant, suggests a reasonable
doubt of its existence, nobody ever sup-
posed that the state could stop short of
removing this doubt, and of establishing
his malice to a moral certainty."
Nebraska: This theory was adopted in
this state in 1876 : Wright v. People, 4
Neb. 408.
New Hampshire : And in this state it
was maintained as early as 1861, and
has since been adhered to: State v.
Bartlett, 43 N. H. 224 ; State v. Jones,
50 Id. 369, 400.
New York: Whatever doubt was sup-
posed to exist as to the law of this state
on this question was effectually put to
rest by the recent decision of the Court
of Appeals, in 0' Connell v. People, 87
N. Y. 380. In that case it is said that
the prosecution must satisfy the jury
"upon the whole evidence that the
prisoner was mentally responsible; for
the affirmation of the issue tendered by
the indictment remained with the prosecu-
tion to tile nd of the trial." The pre-
sumption of sanity stands until repelled.
If the prisoner gives no evidence as to
his insanity, the presumption stands,
but if he gives evidence tending to over-
throw the presumption the prosecution
must produce answering testimony., See
Moett v. People, 85 N. Y. 373; People
v. MJcCann, 16 N. Y. 58.
Tennessee : As we understand the
decision in Dove v. State, 3 Heisk. 348
(1872), thie theory we are considering is
practically adopted in that sate. The
presumption of sanity is sufficient in the
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absence of any evidence of insanity.
If evidence of insanity is introduced and
is sufficient to make an equipoise, then
the presumption of sanity is neutralized,
and the burden devolves on the state to
show the sanity of the defendant.
In addition to the cases we have noted
there are decisions in Connecticut and in
Minnesota which announce that the bur-
den of proving insanity is on the prisoner.
But these decisions are silent as to
whether he must prove his insanity by a
clear preponderance, or only by a mere
preponderance of the evidence: State v.
Hoyt, 46 Conn. 330, 337 ; s. c. 47 Id.
51§ ; Bonfanti v. State, 2 Minn. 123;
State v. Gut, 13 Id. 341.
In a case in Georgia, in 1872, the
Supreme Court of that state said:
"Prima facie all persons are to be con-
sidered sane ; and this is true in criminal
as well as civil trials. If this be the
legal presumption, it would seem to
follow that unless the jury are satisfied
of insanity, they must consider the pris-
oner sane. Perhaps the word satisfied
is rather strong; and were there any
evidence here of insanity, we might
hesitate to sustain the judge:" Holsen-
bake v. State, 45 Ga. 55.
HENRY WADE ROGERS.
Supreme Court of the United States.
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In order to constitute an inspection law, within the meaning of art. 1, sect. 10,
of the Constitution of the United States, it is not necessary that the statute should
provide for an inspection of the quality of the article to be exported, and the fact
that the inspection provided for extends only to the form and dimensions of the
package does not render the statute unconstitutional.
A state may lawfully, by such inspection law, require the articles to be brought
to state warehouses to be inspected.
It may also direct that a certain product, before it becomes an article of commerce
between the states, shall be encased in a package of certain form or dimensions,
and the imposition upon such article, when exported, of a tax to meet the expenses
of inspection is not an unlawful discrimination between the state buyer and the
purchaser who buys for exportation.
Whether it is not exclusively the province of Congress to decide whether a charge
or duty under an inspection law is excessive, quinre.
Certain state statutes provided that no tobacco, the growth of the state, should
be passed or accounted lawful tobacco unless packed in hogsheads of a specified
size ; that inspectors should be appointed whose duty it should be to examine the
hogsheads of tobacco brought to the warehouse to which they should he respectively
assigned; to stamp on each hogshead its weight and the weight of the tobacco; to
open it and take from it samples, and, if the tobacco is merchantable, to deliver it
sealed to the owner, with a certificate. The statute imposed on each hogshead
a charge of $2 outage, if it weighed less than 1100 pounds, and 12 cents for every
additional hundred pounds, and prohibited, under a penalty, any one from carrying
out of the state tobacco raised in the state unless such tobacco should have been so
inspected. The statute further provided that nothing therein contained should pro-
hibit a grower or purchaser of tobacco, who should pack the same in the county
where grown, from exporting it without having it opened for inspection, but that
